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ABSTRACT 
The Political Economy of the German Länder Deficits  
by Beate Jochimsen and Robert Nuscheler * 
We analyze the deficits of the German Länder for the period from 1960 to 2005 
and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political 
economy of public deficits. Estimating a dynamic panel data model, we find 
evidence for political opportunism in the spirit of Rogoff and Sibert: German 
voters seem to favor fiscal discipline as debt issue is significantly lower in pre-
election years. As suggested by the theory, coalition governments issue 
significantly more debt than single party governments. There is no evidence for 
partisan behavior; party ideology plays a negligible role. Strategic debt issue 
may occur when the probability of reelection is small. Our results suggest that 
this kind of political instability has no impact on debt issue. 
 
Keywords: Public Deficit, German Länder, Political Economy, Dynamic Panel, Data 
Model 
JEL Classification: D72, E60, H62 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die politische Ökonomie der Budgetdefizite der deutschen Bundesländer   
Wir analysieren die Entwicklung der Budgetdefizite in den deutschen Bundes-
ländern von 1960 bis 2005 und testen eine Reihe von Hypothesen, die sich aus 
der politökonomischen Literatur öffentlicher Defizite ableiten lassen. Im Rahmen 
eines dynamischen Panel-Modells finden wir Evidenz für politischen Opportu-
nismus im Sinne von Rogoff und Sibert: Deutsche Wähler scheinen fiskalische 
Disziplin zu befürworten, da die Verschuldung in Vorwahljahren signifikant weni-
ger ansteigt als in anderen Jahren. Wie die Theorie nahe legt, wächst die Ver-
schuldung bei Koalitionsregierungen signifikant mehr als bei Alleinregierungen. 
Wir finden hingegen keine Belege für Partisanenverhalten, Parteiideologien 
spielen also eine zu vernachlässigende Rolle. Strategische Neuverschuldung 
könnte erfolgen, wenn die Wiederwahlwahrscheinlichkeit gering ist. Unsere 
Ergebnisse lassen jedoch erkennen, dass diese Art der politischen Instabilität 
keinen Einfluss auf die Neuverschuldung hat.  
                                                 
*  We are indebted to Tom Cusack, Kai A. Konrad, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Friedrich Schneider, Viktor 
Steiner, the participants of the EPCS 2004, the EEA 2006, the IIPF 2006 and several research 
seminars for many helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Alexandra Günther and Walter 
Becker for providing the data and Julia Gerstung and Anna Kossendey for excellent research 
assistance. All remaining errors are ours.  
 
 1 Introduction
Public deﬁcits vary widely between jurisdictions. It is broadly accepted that economic
variables such as economic growth or the interest rate alone cannot explain these dif-
ferences. In fact, political variables and political institutions play an important role in
the development of public debt (Persson and Tabellini, 1997). When comparing diﬀerent
countries, however, one can hardly disentangle the eﬀect of political variables and the
impact of political institutions. This identiﬁcation problem disappears when the inﬂu-
ence of political variables on public debt in the German states (Länder) is analyzed as
the jurisdictions have almost identical political institutions and electoral rules. However,
they diﬀer quite substantially in other dimensions such as ﬁscal policy outcomes and per
capita income. Thus, our data set oﬀers a promising opportunity to solely test for the
inﬂuence of political variables on public deﬁcits.
We test a number of hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature on the political
economy of debt issue. The empirical literature on opportunistic behavior, where political
behavior is solely designed to win the next elections, gives no clear picture. Nordhaus
(1975) ﬁnds evidence of this for two out of four elections in the United States. Berger and
Woitek (1997) as well as Galli and Rossi (2002) ﬁnd weak support for the opportunistic
school. Berger and Woitek (1997), however, conclude that “[...] the evidence in favor
of the Nordhaus approach (is) not convincing” (p. 190). Evidence for partisan politics,
where policy is primarily driven by party ideology, is mixed, too. Alesina (1989), Boix
(2000), Cusack (1997), Hibbs (1977), Tavares (2004) and Reed (2006), for example, ﬁnd
support for the partisan theory, whereas Berger and Woitek (1997), Heckelman (2001),
Seitz (2000), and Galli and Rossi (2002), for instance, ﬁnd no evidence for it.1
Coalition governments are expected to issue more debt than single-party governments.
Again, empirical evidence is not clear cut. Roubini and Sachs (1989) ﬁnd support. Re-
1Evidence for partisan politics is also scarce in non public ﬁnance ﬁelds. Duso (2002), for example,
showed that the government’s ideological position played only a minor role in explaining regulatory reform
in the mobile telecommunications industry in the OECD.
1estimating the Roubini and Sachs model, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) challenge their view
and argue that the coalition eﬀect identiﬁed in Roubini and Sachs (1989) is a result of
minority governments rather than political fragmentation. Using a diﬀerent data set,
DeHaan and Sturm (1997) ﬁnd no coalition eﬀects — neither with the dispersion index
used by Roubini and Sachs nor with the one used by Edin and Ohlsson. In a recent study
on debt of the Flemish municipalities, Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2005) ﬁnd that
political fragmentation aﬀects local indebtedness only in the short but not in the long
run. Finally, political instability may lead to additional debt. In order to commit future
government’s expenditures to debt service, the incumbent may strategically increase debt
issue (see, for instance, Alesina and Tabellini, 1987 and Persson and Svensson, 1989).
We estimate a dynamic panel data model and ﬁnd evidence for opportunistic behavior,
i.e., debt issue is signiﬁcantly lower in pre-election years. Thus, German voters seem to
favor ﬁscal discipline or, at least, the incumbent may believe they do. There is no evidence
for partisan behavior. We ﬁnd evidence for coalitions issuing more debt than single party
governments. A strategic deﬁcit bias due to political instability may arise when the
probability of being thrown out of oﬃce is high. We consider four approximations of that
probability but ﬁnd no evidence for any of them.
The ﬁrst econometric study with German data that considers political variables as
covariates is Frey and Schneider (1979). The current paper, however, is most related to
Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002) who also analyze the political economy of German
Länder ﬁscal policy. Seitz considers the time period from 1976 to 1996 whereas Galli and
Rossi analyze the period from 1974 to 1994. While Seitz concentrates on partisan politics
and deﬁcit data, Galli and Rossi are more ambitious and additionally test for political
business cycles using deﬁcits, expenditures and expenditure categories. We extend these
two works along three lines. First, we explicitly address the role of coalition governments
and political instability and thereby gain a number of new insights. Secondly, due to
the availability of better estimation methods, we also econometrically go beyond Seitz
and Galli and Rossi. Seitz only applies the least squares dummy variable estimator. As
this estimator may be severely biased in short panels we use the bias corrected least
2squares dummy variable estimator that clearly outperforms the uncorrected version (see,
e.g., Bruno, 2005). Galli and Rossi deal with heteroscedasticity but also ignore the bias.
Thirdly, we use data from 1960 to 2005 and thereby extend the analysis from 21 to 46
years. Note that our main result, that is the negative preelection year eﬀect on deﬁcits,
stands in contrast to the ﬁndings in Galli and Rossi who essentially obtain a positive
election year eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the institutional background for Ger-
many is provided. The hypotheses to be tested are derived in Section 3. We thereby
review the theoretical literature on the political economy of debt issue. The empirical
model and the diﬀerent estimators applied are introduced in Section 4. The data set and
the results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Germany’s federal political design
The name “Federal Republic of Germany" (FRG) already highlights the country’s federal
structure that is reﬂected by the levels of government: federal (Bund), state (Land) and
local (Gemeinde). Since German uniﬁcation in 1990 Germany has consisted of sixteen
Länder, the ten Länder of the former West Germany, the ﬁve new Länder of the former
East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), and Berlin. From World War II
to uniﬁcation, Berlin was divided into West Berlin and East Berlin, where the latter was
capital of the GDR. Additionally, there are about 14,000 cities and communities, which
form the local level (Seitz, 2000, p. 188).
The Länder are not mere provinces but states endowed with their own powers. These
powers and responsibilities are speciﬁed in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Germany’s con-
stitution. The Basic Law also guarantees the local authorities the right to independently
administer their own aﬀairs. As the local authorities rely heavily on grants from the
states, their independence is rather limited. Three large German cities, namely, Berlin,
3Bremen and Hamburg, form their own states (Länder). These are the so-called “city-
states" (Stadtstaaten) that do not have local administrative bodies. In contrast, the
other German states are called “non-city-states" (Flächenländer). This distinction is im-
portant since the budgets of the city-states include expenditures and revenues that are
part of the local budgets in non-city-states. Moreover, the expenditures of the non-city-
states include grants to the local authorities whereas there are no such grants to local
authorities in the city-states. Consequently, public expenditures or public debt of the two
types of state are not directly comparable.2
Our study examines the budget deﬁcits of the Länder without taking the local author-
ities into account. As mentioned above, local authorities have their own budgets and their
own parliaments. Election dates typically diﬀer between local and state jurisdictions. As
a consequence, the aggregated local political structure will hardly ever match the political
structure of the Land. This is why we concentrate on the public deﬁcits of the states and
neglect those that may arise at the local level.
2.2 Fiscal federalism in Germany
Although the Länder are endowed with their own powers, an almost total lack of tax set-
ting autonomy exists. Additionally, a large ﬁscal equalization system harmonizes revenues
across states, calculated on the basis of several ﬁscal and economic indicators, and this
strongly distorts incentives to increase the tax base. The situation in Germany, therefore,
diﬀers in one major aspect from the theoretical literature on the political economy of
public expenditures: typically the government has two options for ﬁnancing expenditures
— taxes and debt. But, due to the lack of tax setting autonomy and the equalization
scheme, total revenue of every Land is more or less ﬁxed (for a more detailed overview
see Seitz, 2000, pp. 188-190). To ﬁnance public expenditures, Länder governments only
have one discretionary source of ﬁnancing at their disposal, namely debt. We therefore
2In our empirical model, the state ﬁxed eﬀects account for that fundamental diﬀerence as well as for
other time invariant state characteristics.
4concentrate on public deﬁcits and their political determinants.
There are two more important aspects: First, in 1990, the ﬁve new Länder of former
East Germany and East Berlin joined the FRG, enlarging the population from around 64
millions to roughly 80 millions, while GDP only increased by less than 10 per cent. The
integration of East Germany into the West German social security system, the huge in-
vestments in infrastructure and various other costs of transformation created a substantial
ﬁscal shock. Although during the ﬁrst ﬁve years after uniﬁcation most of the direct ﬁnan-
cial burden was borne by the federal government via a so-called uniﬁcation fund (Fonds
Deutsche Einheit), we control for uniﬁcation in our empirical analysis. Secondly, from
1995 onwards, the new German Länder, i.e. the former East Germany, and Berlin were
included in the ﬁscal equalization system. A large part of this equalization is amongst
the Länder (horizontal equalization). As the new participants were net recipients, this
introduced a ﬁscal burden on the Western Länder, an eﬀe c tt h a tw ea c c o u n tf o ri no u r
analysis.
Finally, two German states, namely Bremen and Saarland, were bailed out by the
federal government. From 1994 onwards they received transfers over and above those of
the ﬁscal equalization scheme. This bailout is likely to reduce debt issue in both states.
Moreover, one could imagine that the occurrence of a federal bailout alters the incentives
of the states to issue debt in general. Our empirical model considers all these aspects.
2.3 Political parties
In Germany, there are four major parties. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green
party (GREEN). While CDU, SPD and FDP ran for elections in the entire period under
study here, the Greens did not. The Green party was founded in 1980 and ﬁrst won
parliamentary seats at the state level in Hamburg and Hesse in 1982 and at the federal
level in 1983. Due to historical developments after World War II, the CDU has never
run for elections in Bavaria. Instead their so-called sister party, the Christian Social
5Union (CSU), participates. The programmes of CDU and CSU, however, are very similar
and they always form one parliamentary group in the federal parliament (Bundestag).
Therefore, we do not distinguish between them and label both CDU.
After uniﬁcation, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was founded, a successor
to the United Socialist Party (SED), the party that ruled East Germany for more than
40 years. Although the PDS has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence in the new Länder, it has not
succeeded in gaining any inﬂuence in the Western Länder.3 As the democratic history of
the East German Länder is rather short, we abstain from including them into our analysis.
Due to its special status, Berlin is also eliminated from the data set (see below for more
details).
Since 1960 the West German Länder were either governed by majority governments of
CDU or SPD or by a coalition that mostly consisted of two parties. The SPD has formed
coalitions with all three other parties, whereas the CDU has only formed coalitions with
the SPD (a so-called ‘grand coalition’) or the FDP. Minority governments as well as other
government constellations have played a negligible role. Table 2 in the Appendix provides,
among other things, an overview of government formations in the West German states.4
3 The political economy of public deﬁcits
T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fc o n ﬂicting theories explaining the formation and the evolu-
tion of public deﬁcits. In this section we review the literature and derive the respective
hypotheses to be tested in Section 5. Our focus is on four theories, namely, political
opportunism, partisan theory, fragmented governments, and political instability.
3To some extent, Berlin is an exception as the SPD currently forms a coalition with the PDS. Note,
however, that today’s Berlin is not a former Western Land.
4For an explanation of the variables see Table 1 in the Appendix.
63.1 Political opportunism
Opportunistic governments are assumed to be primarily interested in being reelected.
There are no ideological motives. Thus, parties “[...] do not care about the eﬀects of
their policies on the economy except insofar as they inﬂuence voters’ electoral choices”
(Alesina, 1987, p. 651). In a two-party system, both competing parties will adopt the
same platform and implement the same policies once elected, thereby maximizing their
chance of being (re-)elected.
The theory of political opportunism was introduced in the context of the ‘Phillips
curve’ (see Nordhaus, 1975 and MacRae, 1977). Among others, Alesina and Perotti
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that this theory can also be ap-
plied to public deﬁcits: to appear competent to voters, the incumbent government has
an incentive to boost the economy prior to elections thereby improving the chances of
being reelected, or, more generally, the incumbent government is prepared to introduce
distorted policies in order to increase the chance of being reelected. Such policies mostly
require raising transfers or increasing public investments, e.g., investments in public in-
frastructure, housing, or hospitals. As German Länder are hardly able to inﬂuence their
returns, the augmented public expenditure will result in (further) debt, especially in elec-
tion years.5
Hypothesis 1 Public deﬁcits are higher in election years.
For such a policy to be successful, voters must not (fully) anticipate that the debt
burden has to be borne after the election; they must be myopic. However, opportunistic
cycles also occur with rational expectations when (some) voters are uninformed in the
sense that they cannot correctly link economic performance to public debt. Rogoﬀ and
Sibert (1988) developed a model based on rational expectations where electoral cycles
originate in (temporary) informational asymmetries. Prior to election, the incumbent
5Of course, one may argue that if the election is early in the year expenditures should raise in the
pre-election year. We discuss this in some detail in Section 5.1.
7government tries to exploit its information advantage. By issuing less debt it can signal
that it is doing well. Low debt demonstrates that the government can provide a given level
of public goods reasonably eﬃcient. Since deﬁcits are visible to voters with a time lag,
the incumbent runs a smaller deﬁcit in the year prior to election. Electoral competition
is, thus, asymmetric as the potential entrant has no such credible tool to signal ﬁscal
competence.
Hypothesis 2 Public deﬁcits are lower in pre-election years.
Consider that a government can be sure of being reelected. For the German case,
B a v a r i as e r v e sa sa ne x a m p l e ,w h e r et h eC S Uh a sb e e ni no ﬃce since the 1950s. As
there is basically no risk of being thrown out of oﬃce, there is no incentive to introduce
distorted policies. Thus, ﬁnding no evidence for political opportunism may simply reﬂect
political stability (see Hypothesis 5).
3.2 Partisan theory
The partisan theory predicts a more expansionary policy for left governments than for
right governments. Left governments typically are more inclined to run redistributive
policies. Public spending may therefore be directed towards mitigating income inequal-
ity by increasing transfers. Such programmes may require debt issue. Considering the
ideological diﬀerences to be time invariant we can state the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Left governments issue more debt than right governments generating a
partisan trend or cycle.
It may be a bit naive to claim that parties only follow their ideological preferences and
do not care about winning the next election. Therefore, consider a two party system where
both the right and the left parties care about winning elections. In electoral competition
both parties will adopt the same platform (the one that maximizes the probability of
being elected) if they are equally well informed about the preferences of the electorate.
8Once elected, each party will implement its most favored policy if it is not committed
to its platform (Alesina, 1988, p. 796). Irrational voters will not anticipate the parties’
incentives to deviate from their announced policy. Whether the left policy or the right
policy is implemented is thus, in this framework, simply a matter of chance.
Alesina (1987, 1988) introduced rational expectations into the partisan theory and
showed that there may be a rational partisan cycle: consider electoral competition to be
a one shot game. Again, parties will announce converging platforms in order to maximize
the probability of winning the election. Rational voters, though, anticipate the parties’
incentives to deviate from their platform and evaluate party programmes rather than party
platforms. The policy implemented will, in general, be determined by party programmes
(and the preferences of the electorate). Additionally, Alesina (1988) showed that policy
convergence may obtain when electoral competition is modeled as an inﬁnitely repeated
game. Convergence breaks down if the discount factor of at least one party is suﬃciently
low, i.e., if reputation is of minor importance.
To summarize, following Alesina (1988) the assumption of time invariant ideological
diﬀerences is equivalent to modeling electoral competition as a one shot game or as an
inﬁnitely repeated game with a suﬃciently low discount factor. Thus, if no partisan
trends are found, this may be due to the non-existence of partisan behavior or due to
strong reputational eﬀects that lead to an adaptation of party policies.6
3.3 Fragmented governments
The theories discussed so far modeled electoral competition between two parties that
simultaneously aim at political power. With only two parties, there is no conﬂict once
one party is elected. With more than two parties, coalition governments may arise, thus
opening up another stage of conﬂict.
6Drazen and Eslava (2005, 2006) oﬀer another argument: if the main partisan trends are in the
structure of public spending rather than in its level, then a deﬁcit approach cannot detect ideological
objectives.
9Persson and Tabellini (1997, pp. 68-71) argue that a coalition government generates
a common pool problem. Each coalition partner tries to allocate as much as possible of
the budget to its constituency neglecting the negative externalities on coalition partners.
As a consequence the costs of further borrowing are not fully internalized.
Hypothesis 4 Coalition governments (a) issue more debt and (b) debt increases in coali-
tion size.
Another theory that explains higher deﬁcits for coalition governments is oﬀered by
Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1994, pp. 22-29): consider a per-
manent ﬁscal shock. Coalition partners will then ﬁg h ta b o u tt h ea l l o c a t i o no ft h eﬁscal
burden to the respective constituencies. This situation is well modeled by the ‘war of
attrition’. In general, delayed adjustment to the ﬁscal shock will obtain, allowing debt to
accumulate.
Duverger’s law suggests that countries with majoritarian electoral systems are more
likely to have single-party governments and countries with proportional electoral systems
are more likely to have coalition governments.7 Thus, the question of whether coalition
governments have diﬀerent incentives to issue debt than single-party governments is of
some importance for the design of the electoral system. So, if we ﬁnd evidence for Hypoth-
esis 4, a switch to a majoritarian electoral system may contribute to ﬁscal stabilization.
3.4 Political instability
The stock of debt links past policies to future policies. So, if the incumbent cannot directly
commit the succeeding government to certain policies, it can do so indirectly by strategic
debt issue. It thereby obliges future expenditures to debt service (Persson and Svensson,
1989). This strategic deﬁc i tb i a si sm o r ei m p o r t a n t ,t h em o r eo f t e ng o v e r n m e n t st u r n o v e r
(Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990).
But, even without this particular bias, political instability may have an impact on
debt: the incumbent government fully internalizes the beneﬁts of additional borrowing
7For an excellent survey of Duverger’s law see Riker (1982).
10but, as the costs of further debt issue only accrue when it is reelected, the incumbent
government does not take full account of the negative impact of future increases in debt
service. This ineﬃciency increases the more unlikely the government’s reelection (Persson
and Tabellini, 1997, pp. 61-68). Both arguments can well be summarized as our ﬁnal
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 The larger the probability of being thrown out of oﬃce, the higher the
public deﬁcit in election years.
4 Empirical model
In recent studies of public deﬁcits or public expenditures the variable of interest has
typically been transformed before running regressions. Cusack (1997) and Seitz (2000),
for example, take its ﬁrst diﬀerence as a share of GDP. This is basically done in order to
obtain stationary time series. We consider growth rates for the same purpose. The major
advantage of our approach is that GDP is not used in the construction of the dependent
variable which could otherwise be a source of endogeneity. We consider the following
dynamic panel data model




2zit + µi +  it,
where dit denotes the growth rate of public debt in state i =1 ,...,N at time t =1 ,...,T
and di,t−1 its ﬁrst lag, t =2 ,...,T. The political variables are summarized in the vector xit,
the control variables in zit. We control for real GDP growth (GDP), the ﬁrst and second oil
crisis (OIL1, OIL2) as well as for German uniﬁcation (UNIFIC) and for the inclusion of the
East German Länder into the ﬁscal equalization scheme (EQUAL). The direct and indirect
eﬀects of the federal government bailout are picked up by the variables BAILOUTHB,
BAILOUTSL and BAILOUT. Finally, debt issue may respond to the ﬁnancial costs of
borrowing, namely, the real interest rate (INTRATE).8 Note that the interest rate varies
over time but not over states. This limits the explanatory power to within state variation.
8Deﬁnition of all variables can be found in the Appendix in Table 1.
11T h et i m ei n v a r i a n ts t a t ee ﬀect is given by µi. We will consider these eﬀects as ﬁxed
rather than random. It can be argued that there is no room for random eﬀe c t sa st h e
entire population, i.e., all ten West German Länder, are included in the study. A more
substantial argument is the existence of long-lasting governments, Bavaria, for instance,
was ruled by the CSU for the entire period considered here. North-Rhine Westfalia is an
example of almost continuous SPD government. Obviously we will have E(xitµi) 6=0 , i.e.
state ﬁxed eﬀects.9 Random disturbance is  it ∼ N(0,σ 2
 ).L e t w0
it =( x0
it|z0
it),t h e nt h e
assumptions of the model can be summarized as follows
E( it js)=0 for i 6= j or t 6= s
E(µi jt)=0 for all i,j,t (2)
E(wit js)=0 for all i,j,s,t.
As is well known, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent when a
dynamic panel data model, like the one in equation (1), is to be estimated. The estimates
of γ will be biased upwards and the coeﬃcients of the exogenous variables will be biased
towards zero (see Hsiao, 1986, pp. 76-78). The ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (or Least-Squares
Dummy Variable, LSDV, estimator) eliminates this source of inconsistency by taking
account of the Länder ﬁxed eﬀects µi. There nevertheless remains a bias, as the lagged
endogenous variable is correlated with the transformed error term. Nickell (1981) showed
that the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator for γ may be seriously biased downwards in short panels.10
Several consistent instrumental variable methods have been developed that, in gen-
eral, can improve on the LSDV estimates. These estimators typically consider the ﬁrst
9The Hausman test suggests that the random eﬀects model is consistent. Note, however, that the test
requires that the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is consistent. As this is clearly violated in a dynamic model (see
below) we follow our intuitive argument and use ﬁxed eﬀects.
10He also showed, however, that the bias approaches zero as T tends to inﬁnity. Since T is relatively
large in our study (T =4 6 ), the bias is likely to be moderate. Note that although T is much smaller in
Seitz (2000, T =2 1 ) and Galli and Rossi (2002, T =2 1 ) they use exactly that argument to justify their
respective estimation procedure.
12diﬀerence version of the model described in equation (1),




2∆zit + ∆ it,
where ∆ is the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, e.g., ∆dit = dit−di,t−1. This transformation elim-
inates the (time invariant) ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimator developed by Anderson and Hsiao
(1982, AH estimator), for example, uses di,t−2 as an instrument for ∆di,t−1 and thereby
removes the source of the bias. The generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano
and Bond (1991), henceforth AB estimator, uses all valid lags of the dependent variable
(in levels) as instruments for ∆dit. The AB estimator is consistent and asymptotically
eﬃcient (when N tends to inﬁnity).11 Due to the larger set of instruments, AB is more
eﬃcient than AH. There is a homoscedastic (one-step) version of the AB estimator and a
two-step version, that, by allowing for heteroscedasticity, may improve eﬃciency. Simu-
lation studies have shown, however, that the two-step AB is - in most cases - less eﬃcient
than the one-step AB, i.e. the two-step AB yields higher standard errors (see, e.g., Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991; Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1997). In principle, eﬃciency gains
may be achievable when applying the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), henceforth BB estimator. However, both the
AB and the BB estimator are micro panel data estimators and have poor ﬁnite sample
properties. As N is small in our study (N =1 0 ), results of both estimators should mainly
be seen as robustness checks.
A more reliable estimator is the bias corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC). The bias
may be approximated to the order of O(T−1) when using the approximation derived
in Nickell (1981), O(T−1N−1) when using Kiviet (1995), and O(T−1N−2) when using
Kiviet (1999). In a simulation study, Bun and Kiviet (2003) show that the Kiviet (1999)
approximation accounts for about 90 per cent of the actual bias. Several simulation studies
11We consider the regressors summarized in wit as strictly exogenous so that variables themselves and all
their lags are valid instruments. Furthermore, note that the AB estimator takes ﬁrst order autocorrelation
of ∆  into account. Thus, neither consistency nor eﬃciency is aﬀected by ﬁrst order autocorrelation. But
second order correlation implies inconsistency (Arellano and Bond, 1991, pp. 281-282).
13have shown that the LSDVC estimator outperforms the consistent estimators described
above in terms of both bias and standard errors (see, e.g., Bruno, 2005 and Judson and
Owen, 1997, 1999). We therefore use the LSDVC estimator for our analysis.
To actually correct the bias one needs an initial consistent estimate of the coeﬃcients
and each of the three estimators AH, AB and BB may be used. As the AB estimator typ-
ically outperforms the AH estimator and appears more robust than the BB estimator (see
Bruno, 2005), we opt for the AB estimator and use the Kiviet (1999) bias approximation.
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions.12
5 Empirical analysis
The data set comprises yearly data for 10 West German Länder from 1960 to 2005. In
the early years of the FRG, i.e. before 1960, the party structure was relatively unstable.
Several small regional parties joined state governments for short periods and disappeared
afterwards. Additionally, diﬀerent coalitions governed within one election period. As this
was clearly just a post-war phenomenon, we do not include these years into our analysis.
As already mentioned, Berlin and the ﬁve new German Länder have not been selected
into our sample. Berlin is excluded for two reasons. First, Berlin was divided before
1990. While East Berlin was the capital of the GDR, West Berlin was part of the FRG.
Second, West Berlin received generous grants from the federal government, making debt
issue more or less unnecessary. From 1990 onwards, data for the East German Länder are
available. We nevertheless do not select them, as the period is simply too short to obtain
suﬃcient (political) variation. We arrive at a balanced panel with 460 observations. The
average annual real GDP growth was 2.8 per cent, whereas the average annual nominal
debt grew with 9.7 per cent. The real interest rate was on average 4.1 per cent (see Table
12The estimates with BB as initial estimator have slightly higher standard errors. Apart from that
results remain unchanged. The complete estimates for the BB and AH estimator are available upon
request.
142).13
Before testing the political economy of debt issue, we brieﬂy discuss the results with
economic indicators and some controls only (Model 1). The regression results are shown in
the ﬁrst column of Table 6 (see Appendix). With a coeﬃcient of around .34, autoregression
is relatively moderate. The impact of real GDP growth is, as expected, signiﬁcantly
negative. When real GDP growth drops by two percentage points debt growth gears up
by roughly one percentage point. This may be due to expenditure programmes, reduced
tax revenues, or both. Both the ﬁrst and second oil crises, OIL1 and OIL2, respectively,
increased debt growth. The eﬀect of the second oil crisis, though, is only signiﬁcant in in
the political models 2 and 3. German uniﬁcation had a negative impact on debt growth
in West Germany. Its insigniﬁcance may be due to the fact that most of the ﬁnancial
burden of uniﬁcation was borne by the social security systems and the German uniﬁcation
fund and not by the states. Moreover, the economy boomed right after uniﬁcation and
this increased tax revenues. This may explain why no further state debt was needed.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the inclusion of the East German Länder into the ﬁscal
equalization system (EQUAL) on public debt growth. The costs of borrowing, measured
by the real interest rate (INTRATE), have the expected negative but insigniﬁcant impact
on debt issue. Finally, the federal government bailout helped consolidating the budget
of Saarland but not Bremen. There seems to be no signiﬁcant incentive eﬀect on debt
i s s u ea r i s i n gf r o mt h eo c c u r r e n c eo ft h eb a i l o u t . 14 As can be seen from the coeﬃcients
and standard errors of the models 2 and 3 (Table 6) all results are robust to the addition
of political variables.
13Deﬁcit data are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2001). Data for the
gross domestic product (GDP) have been provided by the Statistical Oﬃce of Baden Württemberg and
the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. GDP growth and interest rates, were deﬂated by the consumer price index
for all households obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt (2003). The election dates as well as the election
results in both percentage of votes and numbers of seats were taken from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
(2000, Election Research Team).
14Note that the variables EQUAL and BAILOUT are highly correlated; they only diﬀer in 1994. Even
if we drop one of them we do not gain signiﬁcance of the other.
155.1 Political opportunism (Hypothesis 1 and 2)
Before we test the hypotheses let us ﬁr s tt a k eab r i e fl o o ka tt h ed e s c r i p t i v es t a t i s t i c s
shown in Table 3. The average debt growth rate calculated over all years and all states
is 9.7 per cent. For election years, we ﬁnd a growth rate of as much as 10.4 per cent and
for pre-election years 8.0 per cent.
[Table 3 about here]
These numbers suggest that both hypotheses may hold. To test for these hypotheses,
we include two dummy variables in our regression: ELECTION and PREELEC. The
ﬁrst variable equals 1 in election years and zero otherwise, the second accordingly for
pre-election years.
Table 6, column 2, in the Appendix reveals that debt growth in election years is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from reference years. In contrast debt growth is signiﬁcantly
lower in pre-election years. With an only two percentage points smaller debt growth in
pre-elections years the eﬀect appears relatively small. But when relating this number to
average debt growth we arrive at a 20 per cent lower debt growth in pre-election years:
the eﬀe c ti ss u b s t a n t i a l ! W et h u sﬁnd support for Hypothesis 2 but not for Hypothesis
1.15 Although results do not allow us to discriminate between rational and non-rational
expectations, we conclude that German voters seem to be in favor of ﬁscal discipline.
When the election is early in a year one might argue that it is not appropriate to
use election years to test for Hypothesis 1. In that case Nordhaus opportunism may well
imply higher debt in the pre-election year. We would then have to set a cut oﬀ date for
elections. For elections thereafter the election year would be appropriate whereas elections
prior to that date require an investigation of debt in the pre-election year. Of course, the
cut oﬀ date choice will always be arbitrary and it is not clear at all whether such an
approach would yield more reliable results than ours. For two reasons the problem is of
15This diﬀers from Galli and Rossi (2002) who found signiﬁcantly positive election year eﬀects but no
preelection year eﬀects.
16little relevance for our study. First, there were only very few elections early in the year
(8 per cent of elections were in January or February). Second, a cut oﬀ date later than
January 1 would combine the positive election year eﬀect with the negative pre-election
year eﬀect. Thus, our result on Hypothesis 1 can hardly change. A similar argument can
be made with respect to Hypothesis 2. Since the incumbent can easily communicate deﬁcit
information of the last ﬁscal year even when the elections are early such an argument has
not much bite.
One might ask whether the strategy of lower debt issue in pre-election years is used
equally across parties or whether there are some government constellations that make
more use of this tool than others (see Table 6, Model 3 for results). Although coeﬃcients
for SPDFDP coalitions and CDU single party governments are considerably smaller than
for the other government constellations non of these eﬀects is statistically signiﬁcant.
5.2 Partisan theory (Hypothesis 3)
To check whether ﬁscal policy is driven by party ideology, we have to assign every gov-
ernment constellation to either left or right. We categorize SPD governments, SPD/FDP
coalitions and SPD/GREEN coalitions as left. CDU governments and CDU/FDP coali-
tions are labeled right. It is diﬃcult to ascribe a political orientation to grand coalitions,
i.e., coalitions formed by SPD and CDU. There are basically two alternatives. First, do
not label such coalitions at all and use them as a reference category in the estimation.
Second, use the party aﬃliation of the prime minister to assign an orientation. We opted
for the second alternative as only 27 years of grand coalition governments out of 460 years
are simply too few observations for a sensible reference category.16 A similar reasoning
applies to all other government constellations summarized in ELSE (also 27 of 460 years).
These government constellations are considered left when the Social Democrats were in-
volved and right when the Christian Democrats were. When the government turns over
from left to right, or vice versa, the question of whether the government should be labeled
16Results are independent of the alternative adopted.
17left or right in that particular year becomes an issue. We consider the new government’s
ideological position if its inaugural date was prior to July 1 of the respective year.
Before we interpret estimation results let us again ﬁrst take a look at the descriptive
statistics. Table 4 identiﬁes right governments as the ones issuing more debt. As the
diﬀerence in debt growth rates between right governments (9.9 per cent) and left govern-
ments (9.4 per cent) is - as compared to the standard errors - rather low, a signiﬁcant
partisan eﬀect can hardly exist. So, not surprisingly, the corresponding coeﬃcient is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero (Table 6, Model 2) Note, however, that the coeﬃcient
obeys the ‘ correct’ sign.
[Table 4 about here]
Although we ﬁnd no support for Hypothesis 3 — which is well in line with Seitz (2000)
and Galli and Rossi (2002) — interpretation remains diﬃcult (see also the discussion in
Subsection 3.2). It may well be that there are no partisan trends in German Länder
ﬁscal policy — that ideology plays a negligible role. This is, however, not necessarily true.
Once the parties care not only about ideology but also about winning the next election,
platform convergence will occur. Since elections can well be considered a repeated game,
parties will stick to their platforms. Otherwise they risk their reputation: identifying
the opponent as a liar is a powerful weapon in electoral competition. If reputation is
decisive, then platform convergence implies policy convergence and with it adaptation of
ﬁscal policies. Diﬀerences can hardly be detected. And indeed, for Germany, it is usually
argued that both major parties, SPD and CDU, are close to the center.
5.3 Fragmented governments (Hypothesis 4)
231 years of coalition governments yield an average debt growth of 9.4 per cent compared
to 9.9 per cent for the 219 single-party governments. The descriptives, shown in Table 5,
thus, raise doubts about Hypothesis 4.
[Table 5 about here]
18However, one should be cautious when interpreting cross state averages. We, there-
fore, deﬁne the indicator variable COAL that assumes a value of 1 whenever more than
one party formed the government and zero otherwise.17 We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coalition
eﬀect. Its positive sign is perfectly in line with the theory, formulated as part (a) of
the hypothesis. Note also that the coalition eﬀect compares, in absolute terms, to the
pre-election eﬀect, i.e., the eﬀect is large.
Debt issue incentives are the higher the more parties in the coalition. Since there are
only 12 (of 231) coalition years with more than two parties (and all had three parties)
results are very sensitive to outliers. Therefore, we cannot seriously address part (b) of
Hypothesis 4.
5.4 Political instability (Hypothesis 5)
Finally, Hypothesis 5 suggests that the deﬁcit a government runs is negatively correlated
with the probability of being reelected. By issuing further debt the incumbent government
can commit the future government’s expenditures to debt service and can thereby, at least
to some extent, prevent policies that would mainly favor the opponent’s constituency from
being implemented. For two reasons this eﬀect can only occur in election years. First,
t h et i m el a gf r o mt h ed a yt h eb u d g e tw a sp a s s e dt ot h en e x te l e c t i o ni ss i m p l yt o ol a r g e
for all other years. Second, reliable polling data two years prior to an election are simply
not available. But consider, although unlikely, data were available. The deﬁcit might
then also be higher in pre-election years. From our analysis of political opportunism,
however, we know that governments use pre-election deﬁcits to signal ﬁscal competence.
So trying to bind the future government’s hands in pre-election years undermines exactly
that signal. We therefore concentrate on election years.
Another fundamental question is how to approximate the probability of being thrown
out of oﬃce. Maybe the best what could be done is construct a measure using polling
17Again, in years of government changes, we use the inaugural date of the new government and July 1
as cut oﬀ date to assign a value to COAL.
19data. But such data are, unfortunately, not available. There are many strategies for
solving that problem and we consider four of them:18
1. the higher the current majority of the incumbent government, the lower the proba-
bility of being thrown out of oﬃce. A large current majority then goes along with
low debt issue in the election year.
2. the incumbent government correctly anticipates the outcome of the upcoming elec-
tions in terms of votes. This is equivalent to assuming that perfectly reliable polling
data were available (in the pre-election year at the time the election year’s budget
is set up). Then debt issue will be larger, the smaller the number of votes for the
incumbent.19
3. the incumbent government correctly anticipates that elections will be close, or that
the competing party or block will be ahead in terms of votes, then the government
may issue more debt as the likelihood of being reelected is small. Debt issue will be
l a r g e rt h ef u r t h e rt h ec o m p e t i n gb l o c ki sa h e a do ft h ec u r r e n tg o v e r n m e n t . 20
4. the incumbent government correctly anticipates a change of government, then it will
issue more debt in the year of change. We set a change variable to 1 if government
participation of both major parties, i.e. SPD and CDU, changes and if elections
took place. A change from, or to, a grand coalition is, thus, never considered a
change.
18One may argue that the unemployment rate is a good predictor of the reelection probability. Since
unemployment was never signiﬁcant we do not follow that route.
19Of course, there could be the reverse causality, i.e., the incumbent only gains few votes because he
ran a high deﬁcit in the election year. This shortcoming makes interpretation of results diﬃcult.
20We consider two blocks. The CDU forms one block and the SPD together with the Greens the other
block. Putting the Social Democrats and the Greens together is obvious as, in all cases, the Greens were
in government they formed a coalition with the Social Democrats. The FDP is much more ﬂexible. 16
per cent of all governments were SPD/FDP coalitions and 17 per cent were CDU/FDP coalitions. It is
thus impossible to generally allocate the Liberals to one particular block.
20Independent of the approximation used we ﬁnd no support for Hypothesis 5.21 For
approximations 1 to 3 one may argue that grand coalitions, i.e. coalitions between SPD
and CDU, are outliers. As they often have votes of more than 80 per cent this is, in
fact, what they are. To neglect grand coalitions not only seems to make sense from an
econometric perspective but also from a political one. Why, and how, should a grand
coalition issue more debt, when at least one of the two parties will be in government next
period? Therefore, we exclude grand coalitions and rerun regressions. Results do not
change.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We analyzed the political determinants of the West German Länder deﬁcits from 1960 to
2005. Since political institutions and electoral rules are almost identical across German
states, our study does not suﬀer from the fundamental problem of disentangling the eﬀects
of political variables from the impact of political institutions that typically arises when
comparing jurisdictions.
Overall we addressed ﬁve hypotheses taken from the broad theoretical literature on
the political economy of public expenditures and/or public debt issue. We found that
debt growth is signiﬁcantly lower in preelection years. This is well in line with the Rogoﬀ
and Sibert (1988) argument of signalling ﬁscal competence via low debt. With a twenty
per cent lower debt growth rate in pre-election years the eﬀect is large. We also found a
positive and signiﬁcant coalition eﬀect on debt issue. In absolute terms, the eﬀect is about
as large as the pre-election eﬀect. There seems to be a kind of coordination failure within
coalition governments. Ideological motives or strategic considerations do not contribute
to explaining regional variation in deﬁcits of the German states.
21This is why we do not report any estimation results in this subsection. Results are available upon
request.
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Appendix
26Variable Explanation
DEFICIT debt growth rate
DEFICIT(-1) lagged debt growth rate
GDP real growth rate of gross domestic product
INTRATE real interest rate
OIL1 = 1 from 1974 to 1975 (ﬁrst oil crisis)
OIL2 = 1 from 1978 to 1981 (second oil crisis)
UNIFIC = 1 from 1991 to 2005 (uniﬁcation)
EQUAL = 1 from 1995 to 2005 (equalization scheme)
BAILOUT = 1 from 1994 to 2005 (federal government bailout)
BAILOUTHB = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Bremen (Bailout-Bremen interaction)
BAILOUTSL = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Saarland (Bailout-Saarland interaction)
ELECTION = 1 in election years
PREELEC = 1 in pre-election years
LEFT = 1 for SPD dominated governments
RIGHT = 1 for CDU dominated governments
SPD = 1 for single-party Social Democratic governments
CDU = 1 for single-party Christian Democratic governments
SPDFDP = 1 for SPD coalitions with Liberals
SPDGREEN = 1 for SPD coalitions with Greens
GRANDC = 1 for SPD coalitions with the CDU or vice versa
SPDCDU = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and SPD prime minister
CDUSPD = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and CDU prime minister
CDUFDP = 1 for CDU coalitions with Liberals
ELSE = 1 for remaining government constellations
COAL = 1 for coalition governments
COALSIZE number of parties in a coalition
Table 1: Explanation of variables.
Variable N mean s.d. min max
DEFICIT 450 .0967 .1174 -.1500 1.2632
GDP 450 .0275 .0333 -.0476 .1478
INTRATE 460 .0407 .0162 .0112 .0790
SPD 460 .2043 .4037 0 1
SPDFDP 460 .1565 .3637 0 1
SPDGREEN 460 .0783 .2689 0 1
SPDCDU 460 .0348 .1834 0 1
CDU 460 .2739 .4465 0 1
CDUSPD 460 .0239 .1529 0 1
CDUFDP 460 .1696 .3757 0 1
ELSE 460 .0587 .2353 0 1
GRANDC 460 .0587 .2353 0 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
27Variable N mean s.d. min max
DEFICIT 450 .0967 .1174 -.1500 1.2632
DEFICIT*ELECTION 110 .1037 .1232 -.0700 .9814
DEFICIT*PREELEC 111 .0799 .0988 -.1500 .4189
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for political opportunism (Hypotheses 1 and 2).
Variable N mean s.d. min max
LEFT 460 .5130 .5004 0 1
RIGHT 460 .4870 .5004 0 1
DEFICIT 450 .0967 .1174 -.1500 1.2632
DEFICIT*LEFT 232 .0942 .1077 -.0886 .9814
DEFICIT*RIGHT 218 .0992 .1272 -.1500 1.2632
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for partisan politics (Hypothesis 3).
Variable N mean s.d. min max
COAL 460 .5217 .5001 0 1
COALSIZE 460 1.5565 .5631 1 3
DEFICIT 450 .0967 .1174 -.1500 1.2632
DEFICIT*COAL 231 .0943 .1408 -.1500 1.2632
DEFICIT*(1−COAL) 219 .0991 .0864 -.0621 .4767
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for divided governments (Hypothesis 4).
28Variable LSDVC (model 1) LSDVC (model 2) LSDVC (model 3)
DEFICIT(-1) .3410∗∗∗ (.0469) .3433∗∗∗ (.0463) .3432∗∗∗ (.0460)
GDP −.5067∗∗∗ (.1669) −.5258∗∗∗ (.1669) −.5270∗∗∗ (.1700)
INTRATE −.5896 (.3844) −.4476 (.3997) −.3955 (.4067)
OIL1 .1733∗∗∗ (.0280) .1728∗∗∗ (.0281) .1738∗∗∗ (.0287)
OIL2 .0280 (.0171) .0302∗ (.0173) .0302∗ (.0179)
UNIFIC −.0183 (.0205) −.0234 (.0209) −.0189 (.0212)
EQUAL .0085 (.0320) .0075 (.0318) .0079 (.0334)
BAILOUT −.0441 (.0343) −.0412 (.0347) −.0420 (.0361)
BAILOUTHB −.0199 (.0352) −.0256 (.0351) −.0384 (.0473)
BAILOUTSL −.0709∗∗ (.0355) −.0580 (.0365) −.0579 (.0386)

















Dependent variable DEFICIT, N = 430, standard errors in brackets.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10,
Table 6: Regression results. Bias correction of LDSV estimator initialized by Arellano-
Bond estimator.
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